n the event of a war between the two countries with nuclear weapons technology, a nuclear attack from one of the parties will result in a non-winner conflict, even worse complete disappearance of both sides. since the other party is able to respond in the same way with its second-strike forces even if it has a small number of nuclear arsenals. Wohlstetter described second strike capability as attacked state’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons even if the other side attacks with all its nuclear power. He entitled this situation as the delicate balance of terror. (Wohlstetter, 1959, pp. 211-234)
沃尔兹思想的主要焦点之一似乎是威慑。核威慑基于这样一个事实，即如果两国之间发生拥有核武器技术的战争，其中一方的核攻击将导致非胜者冲突，甚至双方完全消失。因为另一方即使拥有少量核武库，也能够以同样的方式对其第二打击力量作出反应。Wohlstetter将第二次打击能力描述为被攻击国即使对方使用其全部核力量进行攻击，也能使用核武器进行报复。他将这种情况称为恐怖的微妙平衡。
From the standpoint of optimist school, deterrence is the most important function of the nuclear world that prompt states to obtain nuclear weapons. According to nuclear rational deterrence theory, nuclear weapons have reduced dramatically the likelihood of war, and most likely they will continue to play a role in preventing prospective conflicts. Since extent of the risk posed by nuclear weapons is extremely high between two nuclear states, the one can not attempt to use nuclear option. In this way, nuclear weapons strengthened international stability and led to absence of war between super power during the Cold War. (Waltz, 1981, p.4) Sagan notes that “The logic of this “proliferation optimist” position flows easily from the expected-utility assumptions of rational deterrence theory: the possession of nuclear weapons by two powers reduces the likelihood of war precisely because it makes the costs of war so great.” (Sagan, 1994, p.67)
从乐观主义学派的观点来看，威慑是促使各国获得核武器的核世界最重要的功能。根据核理性威慑理论，核武器极大地降低了战争的可能性，而且很可能会继续在预防潜在冲突方面发挥作用。由于核武器造成的风险在两个核国家之间非常高，所以一个国家不能试图使用核武器。通过这种方式，核武器加强了国际稳定，并导致冷战期间超级大国之间没有发生战争。萨根指出，“这种“扩散乐观主义”立场的逻辑很容易从理性威慑理论的预期效用假设中得出：两个大国拥有核武器减少了战争的可能性，正是因为这使得战争的代价如此之大。”
However, from organizational perspective used by Sagan concerning nuclear proliferation, state that is about to develop nuclear weapons should not be subjected to preventive attack by nuclear armed state because it can give rise to nuclear war. Moreover, states are not rational unitary actors. Instead, decisions are taken as a result of the conflicting goals between organizations. In nuclear case, military organizations have a significant effect on decision making process. What drives Sagan to being pessimist concerning preventive attack is that military organizations and officers always have a tendency to choose offensive options due to their background. (Sagan, 1994, pp. 69-85) Even in democratic states such as United States, there is a lot of evidence from the Cold War that support the effect of military officials over nuclear decision-making process. (Waltz, Sagan, 2003, pp. 56-61) Preventive war can be considered as a solution in new proliferator states where the military has a high impact on the governance, which cares less about the diplomatic and economic consequences of the decisions. (Sagan, 1994, p.82) Therefore, it is difficult to claim that small number of nuclear weapons can deter the state from attacking in any case.
然而，从萨根关于核扩散的组织角度来看，即将发展核武器的国家不应受到核武装国家的预防性攻击，因为这可能引发核战争。此外，国家不是理性的单一行为者。相反，决策是组织间目标冲突的结果。在核情况下，军事组织对决策过程有重大影响。萨根之所以对预防性攻击持悲观态度，是因为军事组织和军官总是倾向于根据他们的背景选择进攻选项。即使在美国等民主国家，冷战期间也有大量证据支持军事官员对核决策过程的影响。预防性战争可以被认为是新扩散国家的一种解决方案，因为在这些国家，军队对治理有很大影响，而对决策的外交和经济后果不太关心。因此，很难断言少量核武器在任何情况下都能阻止国家进攻。
Finally, another aspect for the deterrence is the principle of no first use. Not being the first state using nuclear weapons in a potential conflict fits the logic of deterrence theory. This is a declared strategy for America, Russia, France, England and China and India. In this way, states display that their only reason for obtaining nuclear weapon is to increase their deterrence and defensive capability. On the other hand some states such as North Korea, Pakistan and Israel may be t
