nd financial centres can be easily bombed as a result of the second-strike attack. (Waltz, 1981, p.19) States would not want to face such a danger for benefits that are very low compared to the cost of war. While the states with the option of preventive or pre-emptive war may have the advantage of first strike as the states of traditional war times, the second strike from other side may cause great damages. Deciders of state that behave rationally would not risk even preventive strike against antagonist who develop nuclear weapons because the probability of being sure that adversary do not have yet ready-to-use weapons is highly low. (Waltz, 1981, p.7) However, it seems that two of the most important human senses are being ignored; fear and panic. Waltz’s thoughts are based on the fear that states do not take the risk of huge damage in return for limited benefits. But, the other side of the coin is that fear, in a moment of panic, may force states to take action irrationally. What if irrational rulers with nuclear weapons see no possibility for their own survive on the threshold of nuclear war? Even if, it can be contended that spread of nuclear weapons may reduce the possibility of full-scale war given the territory between regional adversaries, it is likely to increase aggression of the nuclear power, in particular, states ruled by dictator such as North Korea in which one man has no responsibility to any organizations and law regarding his actions.
谈到核世界，沃尔兹认为，在小冲突或升级的情况下，核武器迫使各方对争端加深的可能性更加谨慎。双方都避免威胁对手的切身利益，因为即使是少量武器也可能导致灾难性后果。如果各国知道军事和金融中心很容易因第二次袭击而遭到轰炸，那么就没有必要将核武器用于进攻目的。国家不希望面临这样的危险，因为与战争成本相比，收益非常低。与传统战争时期的国家相比，拥有预防性或先发制人战争选项的国家可能具有第一次打击的优势，但另一方的第二次打击可能会造成巨大损失。理性行事的国家决策者甚至不会冒险对开发核武器的对手进行预防性打击，因为确定对手尚未准备好使用武器的可能性很低。然而，人类最重要的两种感官似乎被忽视了；恐惧和恐慌。沃尔兹的想法基于这样一种恐惧，即国家不会冒着巨大损失的风险换取有限的利益。但是，硬币的另一面是，在恐慌时刻，恐惧可能会迫使各国采取非理性的行动。如果拥有核武器的非理性统治者看不到自己在核战争的门槛上生存的可能性会怎样？即使有人认为，鉴于地区对手之间的领土，核武器的扩散可能会减少全面战争的可能性，但这可能会增加核大国的侵略，特别是朝鲜等独裁者统治的国家，在这些国家中，一个人对任何组织和法律都不负责。
Pessimists state that nuclear powers did not apply their weapons whatever the reason. On the other hand after the cold war, some regions in the world that have tension arising from religious or ethnic reasons may engender the use of nuclear weapons. First of all, in 1999, Kargil War indicates that nuclear powers can start conventional war against each other. (Sagan, Waltz, 2003, p.96) Furthermore, no one can guarantee that if Slobodan Milosevic, who was the President of the Republic of Serbia during the Bosnian War, had possessed, he would not have applied nuclear weapon option. Long established religious or ethnic disputes and geographic proximity between opponents can create more dangerous situations than the Cold War.
悲观主义者表示，无论出于何种原因，核大国都没有使用其武器。另一方面，冷战后，世界上一些因宗教或族裔原因而紧张的地区可能会使用核武器。首先，1999年，卡吉尔战争表明，核大国可以相互发动常规战争。此外，没有人能保证，如果波斯尼亚战争期间担任塞尔维亚共和国总统的斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇拥有核武器，他就不会使用核武器。长期存在的宗教或种族争端以及对手之间的地理接近可能会造成比冷战更危险的局面。
When it comes to states suffering political crisis or civil war, Waltz remarks that ”Nuclear weapons induce caution, especially in weak states.” (Waltz, 1981, p.14) While scud missiles that can hold nuclear warhead have been used during Syrian and Libyan Civil War, it appears that probability of nuclear strike during civil war is being ignored by Waltz. Even more importantly, civil wars create convenient environment for the accidental use of nuclear weapons.
当谈到遭受政治危机或内战的国家时，沃尔兹说：“核武器会引起警惕，特别是在弱国。”虽然在叙利亚和利比亚内战期间使用了可携带核弹头的飞毛腿导弹，但沃尔兹似乎忽略了内战期间核打击的可能性。更重要的是，内战为意外使用核武器创造了便利的环境。
Nuclear Accidents 核事故
The other debate, between optimist and pessimist, has stemmed from the probability of nuclear accidents. Waltz argues that nuclear states are more careful concerning their nuclear ammunition owing to risk of accident and anonymous use in both crisis and peace time. (Waltz, 1995, p,9) On the other hand, for a couple of reasons, possibility of accidental war should not be overlooked. First of all, nuclear weapons can be fired as a result of the false warnings during the war. For example, Pakistan or I
