regards to arms race between nuclear states, Waltz defends that if states have second strike nuclear capability, they are likely to reduce their conventional military expenditure levels, and they consider nuclear arms racing as unnecessary because of their deterrence capacity: (Waltz, 1990)
关于核国家之间的军备竞赛，沃尔兹辩护说，如果国家拥有第二次打击核能力，它们很可能会削减常规军事开支水平，而且它们认为核军备竞赛是不必要的，因为它们具有威慑能力：
”Conventional arms races will wither if countries shift emphasis from conventional defence to nuclear deterrence. For Pakistan, for example, acquiring nuclear weapons is an alternative to running a ruinous conventional race with India. And deterrent strategies make nuclear arms races pointless.” (Waltz, 1981, p.26)
“如果各国将重点从常规防御转向核威慑，常规军备竞赛就会消亡。例如，对巴基斯坦来说，获得核武器是与印度进行毁灭性常规竞赛的一种选择。威慑战略使核军备竞赛毫无意义。”
On the other hand, in the light of evidence provided by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it is obvious for India and Pakistan, military expenditures have increased remarkable since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, India’s military spending had risen by 45 per cent between 2008 and 2017. India was the fifth largest military spender in the world in 2017. (Fleurant, Wezeman, 2018) India and Pakistan have also incentive to expand their nuclear material production capabilities. (Kile, Kristensen, 2017) It seems that Karl was wrong to claim that scarcity of resources would limit to arms racing in South Asia. (Feaver, Sagan and Karl, 1997, p.189) Statistics prove that there has not been a correlation between obtaining nuclear weapons and reducing military expenditure. As long as the states fell insecure in the face of threats created by their foes, they need to have the ability to retaliate proportionally in both conventional and nuclear ways.
另一方面，根据斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所提供的证据，印度和巴基斯坦的军事支出自冷战结束以来明显增加。此外，印度的军费开支在2008年至2017年间增长了45%。2017年，印度是世界第五大军费开支国。印度和巴基斯坦也有动力扩大其核材料生产能力。卡尔声称资源匮乏将限制南亚军备竞赛似乎是错误的。统计数据证明，获得核武器与削减军费之间没有关联。只要这些国家在面对敌人制造的威胁时感到不安全，它们就需要有能力以常规和核方式进行相应的报复。
Optimistic approach regarding arms race seems inadequate not only because nuclear states continue to allocate a huge amount of money to conventional arms industry but also because decisions emerging from domestic politics are one of the main causes of unnecessary military expenditure. Sagan, who is one of the main critics of Waltz’s theory, claim that in addition to perceived foreign threat, bureaucratic organizations and actors may play an important role in deciding defense spending by supporting politicians who share their thoughts and manipulating public opinion. (Sagan, 1996-1997, p.64)
关于军备竞赛的乐观态度似乎是不够的，不仅因为核国家继续向常规武器工业分配大量资金，而且因为国内政治产生的决定是不必要军费开支的主要原因之一。萨根是沃尔兹理论的主要批评者之一，他声称，除了感知到的外国威胁外，官僚组织和行为体可能通过支持分享想法的政客和操纵公众舆论，在决定国防开支方面发挥重要作用。
Moreover, even if we assume that states should be satisfied with small number of nuclear arsenals because of their deterrence capabilities, other factors affecting military spending are norms and symbolic functions. For instance, apart from Soviet threat over Europe, another reason for France’s nuclear weapons development is the desire to increase its prestige in international relations. After the prestige lost in World War II and withdrawal from Egypt in 1956, France decided to become nuclear state as a way of displaying its rooted great power status. (Sagan, 1996-1997, p.78) To appear strong is important as symbolic in international relations, in spite of the fact that developing nuclear weapons is not considered as prestigious today, states that have adversaries will continue to invest a lot in conventional and nuclear arms industry with the intention of gaining psychological advantage.
此外，即使我们假设各国因其威慑能力而对少量核武库感到满意，但影响军费开支的其他因素是规范和象征功能。例如，除了苏联对欧洲的威胁外，法国发展核武器的另一个原因是希望提高其在国际关系中的威望。在第二次世界大战中失去威望并于1956年从埃及撤军后，法国决定成为一个核国家，以此显示其根深蒂固的大国地位。在国际关系中，表现出强大的象征意义很重要，尽管发展核武器在今天并不被视为享有盛誉，但拥有对手的国家将继续在常规武器和核武器工业上投入大量资金，以期获得心理优势。
Deterrence 威慑
It appears that one of the main focal points of Waltz’s ideas is deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is based on the fact that i
