ndia, that have a geographic proximity, may only have a limited time to decide whether they must retaliate in response to wrongly perceived nuclear attack launched from their enemies.
乐观主义者和悲观主义者之间的另一场争论源于核事故的可能性。沃尔兹认为，由于在危机和和平时期都有发生事故和匿名使用的风险，核国家对其核弹药更加谨慎。另一方面，出于几个原因，不应忽视意外战争的可能性。首先，由于战争期间的错误警告，核武器可能会被发射。例如，地理位置相近的巴基斯坦或印度，可能只有有限的时间来决定是否必须报复，以应对敌人错误地认为的核攻击。
Second, Inadequate nuclear projects in terms of security increase the likelihood of nuclear accident in states suffering financial matters. It seems that Waltz underemphasises this probability: ”Although some of the new nuclear states may be economically and technically backward, they will either have expert scientists and engineers or they will not be able to produce nuclear weapons.” (Waltz, 1995, p.9) However, states such as North Korea possessing nuclear weapons or Iran that will be able to develop nuclear weapons may ignore the necessities related to safety procedures due to lack of finance and time limit. Because of their threat perception, new proliferators may give more importance to having nuclear weapons as soon as possible than security measures.
第二，核项目在安全方面的不足增加了遭受金融危机的国家发生核事故的可能性。沃尔兹似乎没有强调这种可能性：“尽管一些新的核国家可能在经济和技术上落后，但它们要么拥有专家科学家和工程师，要么就无法生产核武器。”然而，拥有核武器的朝鲜或能够发展核武器的伊朗等国家可能会因为缺乏资金和时间限制而忽视与安全程序相关的必要性。由于他们对威胁的感知，新的扩散者可能更重视尽快拥有核武器，而不是安全措施。
Thirdly, organizations that in charge of nuclear weapons may give less importance to safety. By taking into consideration its boundedly rational structures, it is doubtful that they will overcome all problems caused by hazardous nuclear technologies. (Sagan, Waltz, 2003, p.74) Structure of organizations that contains a wide range of routines and complex procedures can lead to disregard of even the simplest precautions. Cuban missile crisis can be given as an example to the problems caused by the organizational routines. During the deployment of nuclear weapons, missile sites were not camouflaged because of the Soviet operating procedures with the result that American intelligence established the installation of weapons. (Allyn, Blight and Welch, 1989-1990, p.153).
第三，负责核武器的组织可能不太重视安全。考虑到其有限的合理结构，它们是否能够克服危险核技术所带来的所有问题，是值得怀疑的。组织结构包含广泛的常规和复杂的程序，可能导致忽视最简单的预防措施。古巴导弹危机可以作为组织惯例造成的问题的一个例子。在部署核武器的过程中，由于苏联的操作程序，导弹阵地没有被伪装，因此美国情报部门确定了武器的安装。
Last but not least, In the past, some countries have developed nuclear weapons in secret. In future, as a result of the international norms against nuclear proliferation, more states may opt to be opaque when they develop nuclear weapons. Opacity gives rise to lack of publicl awareness and absence of international pressures and supervision, and in this way drive states to become less cautious about security issues. (Feaver, Sagan and Karl, 1997, p.191)
最后但并非最不重要的是，在过去，一些国家秘密开发了核武器。未来，由于反对核扩散的国际准则，更多国家在发展核武器时可能选择不透明。不透明导致公众缺乏意识，缺乏国际压力和监督，从而促使各国在安全问题上变得不那么谨慎。
Waltz was right in emphasizing the fact that there was no accident during the cold war despite enormous concern from pessimist school. Optimists are also right in mentioning that unassembled and undeployed nuclear warheads provides security for nuclear states. However, on the threshold of war, it is most likely that states will incline to make their nuclear arsenals ready to be used. By considering that Pakistan did not even have advanced electronic locks on nuclear arsenal, and their nuclear weapons have been alerted against possible attack since 1999 Kargil crisis, it can be asserted that there would have been no surprise if there had been a nuclear war between Pakistan and India emerging from accidental use. In similar cases, nuclear states can face enormous dangers regarding accidental use because of unsafe operating procedures and technological insufficiencies.
沃尔兹强调了一个事实，即冷战期间没有发生任何事故，尽管悲观主义学派对此深表担忧。乐观主义者也正确地提到，未组装和未部署的核弹头为核国家提供了安全保障。然而，在战争即将到来之际，各国极有可能倾向于使其核武库随时可用。考虑到巴基斯坦在核武库上甚至没有先进的电子锁，而且自1999年卡吉尔危机以来，巴基斯坦的核武器已被警告可能受到攻击，可以断言，如果巴基斯坦和印度之间因意外使用而爆发核战争，那就不足为奇了。在类似的情况下，由于操作程序不安全和技术不足，核国家可能面临意外使用的巨大危险。
Arms Race 军备竞赛
With
