ative accounting’ to increase profits or reduce profits to be reported. The owner usually puts a floor under the most minimal profit in order to get the bonus. From the pattern of this bonus manager will raise earnings up to above the minimum level earlier. But if the owner of the company making the upper limit to get the bonus, then the manager will seek to reduce the upper limit earlier profit and current profit transfer to future periods. This he did because if earnings past the upper limit of the manager is not getting an extra incentive for their efforts to make a profit above the limit set by the owners of the company.
Healy在Scott中提出，经理人的行为往往与奖金的发放相一致。如果奖金的发放取决于将产生的利润，那么经理将进行“创造性会计”，以增加利润或减少需要报告的利润。为了获得奖金，业主通常会在最微薄的利润下设置一个下限。根据这种奖金模式，经理会提前将收入提高到最低水平以上。但是，如果公司的所有者为了获得奖金而设定了上限，那么经理将寻求降低上限，将早期利润和当前利润转移到未来时期。他这样做是因为，如果收入超过经理的上限，他们就不会因为努力使利润超过公司所有者设定的上限而获得额外的激励。
Formula bonus used Healy based on the assumption that the company consists of managers who risk averse so that the manager will choose discretionary accrual to lower earnings as earnings before decisions accrual smaller than bogey (lower limit) or exceeding the cap (upper limit) to raise earnings as earnings before decision accrual exceeds bogey but does not exceed the cap. Implications proposed by Healy is that managers will behave in an opportunistic face intertemporal choice.
Healy使用的公式奖金是基于这样一种假设，即公司由厌恶风险的经理组成，因此经理将选择酌情应计来降低决策前的收益——应计小于柏忌（下限）或超过上限（上限）——以提高决策前的收入——应计超过柏忌但不超过上限。希利提出的含义是，管理者将在跨期选择中表现出机会主义。
Debt-covenant hypothesis 债务契约假说
Research in the field of positive accounting theory also explains the accounting practices regarding how managers address the debt agreement. Managers in addressing any violation of the loan agreement has matured, will attempt to avoid it by selecting accounting policies that benefit themselves. Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) suggests there are two events in the selection of accounting policies, which at the time of holding the debt agreement and the maturity of debt. Contract long-term debt (debt covenants) an agreement to protect the lender from the actions of the manager against the interests of creditors, such as excessive dividend, or let the equity is below a predetermined level. Increasingly likely a company to violate debt covenants then the manager will tend to choose accounting procedures to transfer the upcoming earnings period to the current period because it can reduce the risk of default. Sweeney (1994) in Scott (1997) suggests the behavior of ‘moving’ the profit made by the troubled company which threatened bankruptcy and a strategy for survival.
实证会计理论领域的研究也解释了管理者如何处理债务协议的会计实践。管理人员在处理任何违反贷款协议的行为时，都会试图通过选择有利于自己的会计政策来避免。Fields、Lys和Vincent认为，会计政策的选择有两个事件，即持有债务协议时和债务到期时。合同长期债务（债务契约）是一项协议，旨在保护贷款人免受管理人侵害债权人利益的行为的影响，如超额股息，或让股权低于预定水平。一家公司违反债务契约的可能性越来越大，那么经理将倾向于选择会计程序将即将到来的盈利期转移到当期，因为这可以降低违约风险。Sweeney在Scott中提出了“转移”陷入困境的公司的利润的行为，这家公司面临破产的威胁，并提出了生存策略。
Political-cost hypothesis. 政治成本假说
In the view of agency theory, large companies will disclose more information than smaller companies. Great company to do so in an attempt to reduce the cost of the agency. Large enterprises face greater political cost because it is an entity that many highlighted by the public in general. The employees concerned saw profit rise as a reference to improve their welfare through salary increases. The government sees rise in corporate profits as subject to tax that will be charged. So the choice faced by the organization is in what way through the accounting process so that profits can be shown lower. It is often called the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman: 1986).
在代理理论看来，大公司会比小公司披露更多的信息。伟大的公司这样做是为了降低代理成本。大型企业面临更大的政治成本，因为它是一个许多人普遍强调的实体。有关员工将利润增长视为通过加薪来改善福利的参考。政府认为企业利润的增长需要缴纳税款。因此，组织面临的选择是通过何种方式进行会计处理，以降低利润。它通常被称为政治成本假说。
Various kinds of patterns performed in the framework of creative accounting by Scott (1997) as follows:Scott在创造性会计的框架下进行的各种模式如下
Taking Bath 注销一笔巨大资产
Taking Bath, also called big bath. This pattern can occur for no organizational pressu
