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Essay提出国际奥委会都有他们需要实现的目标，并为特定的交易附加一个卓越的质量水平。在这种特定的情况下，物物交换的情况是由有用的和冲突的组件以及相关的选择的事件来描述的。没有正常的热情，就没有什么可安排的，没有斗争，就没有任何可安排的。依赖涉及对共同活动的要求，而不是单方面的活动。Grosse和Behrman认为，这两次聚会之间的利益差异或冲突成分对理解讨价还价的环境具有重要意义。交易决定了如何解决利益差距，以及合作的条件，如果可以想象的话。两次聚会的目标越相似，易货程序就越不麻烦，达成合意交易结果的可能性就越大。在这种独特的情况下，国际奥委会和主办国之间的易货交易被描述为两个集会之间的重要合作，寻求一个共同的适当行动方案，同时努力扩大自己的特定利益。双方关系正常，有兴趣达成有益的谅解，但他们的利益并非没有区别。本站提供各国各专业essay范文以及essay写作指导服务，如有需要可咨询本平台。
