的讨价还价关系。Klapp认为，与统一的独裁者政府相比，权力下放、代理人多数统治的政府更无力应对国内社会集会的影响。
Factors affect the balance of power between states and multinational corporations in the oil industry 影响石油行业国家与跨国公司权力平衡的因素
The cooperation amongst IOCs and host governments is a dynamic procedure in which both the host state and IOC have objectives that they need to fulfill and append a level of remarkable quality to the specific transaction. In this specific situation, a bartering circumstance is portrayed by the incident of helpful and clashing components and in addition associated choices. Without normal enthusiasm, there is nothing for which to arrange and without struggle nothing about which to arrange (Iklé, 1964; Jönsson, 2002). Reliance involves the requirement for common, as opposed to one-sided, activity. Grosse and Behrman (1992) contend that it is the difference of interests or clashing components between the two gatherings that are significant for comprehension the haggling circumstance. Dealing decides how the disparity of interests is to be settled and the conditions under which collaboration is to occur, if by any stretch of the imagination. The more comparable the objectives of two gatherings, the less troublesome the bartering procedure gets to be, and the more probable that an agreeable dealing result will be come to. In this unique circumstance, bartering between an IOC and the host state is portrayed as a vital collaboration between two gatherings looking for a commonly adequate course of action while every endeavors to expand its own particular benefit. Both sides carry on normally and have interests in achieving a helpful understanding yet their interests are not indistinguishable.
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