licy may differ from the NGOs’ objectives and/or the beneficiaries’ interests, which may lead to a conflict of interest. The availability of substantial government grants may tempt NGOs or the program beneficiaries to become involved in programs inconsistent with their own objectives and capacities. The sheer size of government grants and certain government grant restrictions (specific countries, certain social groups, special forms of assistance) may lead to an imbalance in the NGOs’ programs. Some NGOs have, more or less, become contractors to governments, particularly if they do not have other programs or funding sources. NGOs may become unwilling to criticize government publicly thus softening their advocacy work and/or human rights campaigns.
资金是非政府组织管理中的一个非常重大的挑战。非政府组织需要资金来执行计划和维护组织。非政府组织无法获得资金可能意味着完全“停滞”。非政府组织大部分时间可能依赖政府提供资金。然而，在很大程度上依赖公共财政的非政府组织有可能通过实施以前由其本国政府或多边机构开展的活动而沦为政府下属机构。政府政策可能与非政府组织的目标和/或受益人的利益不同，这可能导致利益冲突。大量政府赠款的可用性可能会诱使非政府组织或项目受益人参与与其自身目标和能力不符的项目。政府赠款的规模和某些政府赠款限制（特定国家、特定社会群体、特殊形式的援助）可能会导致非政府组织项目的失衡。一些非政府组织或多或少已经成为政府的承包商，特别是如果他们没有其他计划或资金来源的话。非政府组织可能不愿意公开批评政府，从而削弱了他们的宣传工作和/或人权运动。
Also, as government funding may be comparatively easy to obtain, there is the risk of the NGO ignoring or downgrading their traditional sources of private funding and traditional relationships with their constituencies. In addition, as non-governmental providers of development services, NGOs (and their programs) became subject to the availability of government funds (with associated uncertainty about magnitudes and timing), to some degree of governmental control and supervision, and to the rules and procedures that went with the receipt and use of public funds. This tended to impose heavy and sometimes excessive requirements on NGO administrative and audit capacities (Van Der Heijden, 1987).
此外，由于政府资金可能相对容易获得，非政府组织可能会忽视或降低其传统的私人资金来源以及与选民的传统关系。此外，作为发展服务的非政府提供者，非政府组织（及其方案）受制于政府资金的可用性（与数量和时间相关的不确定性）、一定程度的政府控制和监督，以及与公共资金的接收和使用相关的规则和程序。这往往会对非政府组织的行政和审计能力提出沉重的要求，有时要求过高。
Another problem with funding is the issue of rejection of ‘core funding’- a situation whereby donors are only willing to pay ‘project’ costs. According to Bornstein (2003), NGO managers that are not competent enough to incorporate core costs within project proposals usually have their key functions not being funded. Organizational development, experimental pilot approaches and long-term impact analysis are being abandoned due to lack of funds.
资金的另一个问题是拒绝“核心资金”的问题，即捐助者只愿意支付“项目”费用。根据Bornstein的说法，没有能力将核心成本纳入项目提案的非政府组织管理人员，其关键职能通常没有资金支持。由于缺乏资金，组织发展、试验性试点方法和长期影响分析正在被放弃。
Finally, financial uncertainty affects planning for NGOs. It has also forced them to look for more financial sources and adopt private sector-like methods like downsizing. Take for example; shortage of funds is forcing many South African NGOs outside the donor loop to diversify income sources. They are redefining their relationships to the state and the market, taking on government contract work, selling services to the private sector and charging user fees. Some have had to downsize and depend on short-term contract staff while others are experimenting with their legal status and turning into ‘non-profit’ companies. (Bornstein 2003).
最后，财务不确定性影响非政府组织的规划。这也迫使他们寻找更多的资金来源，并采取类似私营部门的方法，如裁员。举个例子；资金短缺迫使许多南非非政府组织在捐助循环之外实现收入来源多样化。他们正在重新定义与国家和市场的关系，承担政府合同工作，向私营部门出售服务，并收取用户费用。一些公司不得不缩减规模并依赖短期合同员工，而另一些公司则在尝试他们的法律地位，并转变为“非盈利”公司。
LEADERSHIP 领导力
Leadership in NGOs is a matter of concern considering the highly personalized nature of leadership in the sector. The sector is full of anecdotal stories about the detrimental impact of paternalistic founder leaders, “charismatic autocrats,” or “the guru syndrome” (Hailey, 1999). On one hand such leaders demonstrate a drive and commitment, and a remarkable ability to mobilize people and resources. While on the other hand they are criticized for dominating organizations, being unaccountable, and failing to adapt to changing circumstances. Chambers (1997) points out that such NGO leaders can ach
