[内容提要]
在哥本哈根举行的联合国气候变化大会在一片争议声中闭幕了。美国新任总统奥巴马在会上高调提出建设一个新的机制取代美国长期不愿加入的“京都议定书”等建议。本文借助博弈工具分析奥巴马在世界气候变化问题上的战略选择。指出此战略的实质是“强化规则，弱化行动”的模糊战略。在加入有约束性的国际气候变化机制的问题上，美国将长期以“未加入”的身份处于“加入”的状态中，实现在不影响国内利益的前提下收获国际声望的最优战略结果。而且鉴于分析前提的相对稳定性，这种战略选择很有可能成为美国的长期战略，而非这一届美国政府的个别态度。
Abstract
In The United Nations Climate Change Conference closed in a huge controversy. The new United States president Obama advocated using a new regime to instead "Kyoto Protocol" which the US had refused to join in. In this paper, we’ll use the game theory to analyze Obama’s strategy choice. Point out that the essence of this strategy is "more regimes, less action". On the problem of whether joining in the binding regime on climate change or not, the United States will maintain in a “joining” process with a “not joint” status for a long while. By this strategy the president can get the best result of earning international prestige without affecting the national
interests. Since the premises’ stability, this choice is likely to be the US's long-term strategy, rather than the individual attitude of this current government.
一、 奥巴马遭遇“气候困境”
二、 奥巴马的“气候博弈”
三、奥巴马的“气候战略”新思路
四、 美国的“气候战略”将相对稳定
