the outcome of mutual dependence is oftentimes indecisive.
Even though making predictions about the equilibrium levels of the industry is complicated, there are some factors that primarily affect the probable outcome that will be achieved in an environment with communication between firms. Structure of the market, entry barriers, market concentration, transparency, patience and other characteristics of the firms are just a few examples to name here. In addition to all these, practices by government and last but not least the "facilitating practices" account for the existing equilibrium in the market. All these factors contribute to the circumstance of the market environment and the outcome. As a result of these factors the market outcomes can move in a less competitive path, and the firms can shape their behavior, either deliberately or not, in a manner that will eliminate the complicating environment conditions which prevent those from reaching pure oligopolistic conditions. In order to reach market conditions which allow them to generate coordinated strategies related with price and output, the firms can primarily involve in make an explicit agreement to fix prices or to share customers. Even though these sort of agreements are perceived as a direct violation of the antitrust law, the empirical findings imply that majority of the success stories of cartels are accounted for this types of explicit agreements (S. & Nagata, 1994-1995). However, there are also other types of practices which alleviate the conditions to reach anti-competitive conditions even though they are not based on explicit agreements. In the literature, these types of practices are referred to as "facilitating practices" (Buccirossi, 2008). In the following section the types and examples of them will be discussed and some examples include: exchange of price and other information, delivered pricing, product standardization etc.
Conducting "facilitating practices" result in anti-competitive outcomes by either reducing transparency or by changing incentives of the firms. By means of these two channels, a sustainable consensus can be reached and following an implicit price might become more profitable for firms. Either of these cases leads to levels of price and output which are anti-competitive.
One point to note here is about incentives that these types of practices generate. Most of the time the firms follow the "path" designed by the implicit agreement not because they promised to do so, but as it is in their own self-interest. Hence even though the conduct is not explicit and not written, what makes it materialize is not firms' loyalty to each other but their interest. Therefore, in any time, deviations from the agreed upon prices or market shares might occur.
Interestingly, there are times when some government actions lead to appearance of facilitating practices in the market. For example, requirements to publish prices or some unnecessary price and product regulations may cause anti-competitive outcomes to exist in the market. In other words, as a result of government interventions, the firms might involve in facilitating practices even if they do not intend to do so.
More interestingly, practices which mitigate anti-competitive outcome may in other situations be pro-competitive. For instance, they may provide consumers with information to drive competition and as a result lead to higher level of efficiency in contrast to usual effect they were expected to provide.
The final im
